

Dividing the Spoils of Power: How Are the Benefits of Majority Party Status Distributed in U.S. State Legislatures?

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ABSTRACT

We assess the conditions under which majority status generates benefits for incumbent legislators and how these benefits are distributed among members of the majority party. We argue that majority status is valuable only in procedurally partisan chambers; that is, when the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions and control of the legislative agenda. Contrary to the existing literature, we also posit that these rewards should be distributed broadly across the majority party. To test our expectations, we utilize 10 recent transitions in the partisan control of U.S. state legislatures and data on campaign contributions. Consistent with our expectations, majority status is valuable, but only in procedurally partisan chambers. Furthermore, the premium in campaign contributions enjoyed by the majority party is primarily distributed to backbenchers, although top party leaders also benefit. These results provide important insights into the distribution of power and influence in U.S. state legislatures.

DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER of scholarly articles and books devoted to evaluating partisan theories of legislative organization, little attention has been paid to the implications of chamber-wide majority party advantage at the level of individual legislators. The existing literature has focused on whether the majority party collectively enjoys substantial advantages in the legislative process, not who in the majority party benefits (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich 1995). Do these benefits accrue exclusively to majority party leaders or to individual members outside of the party leadership? What are the relative magnitudes of these benefits? What conditions determine their distribution?

This article addresses these questions in the setting of U.S. state legislatures. In particular, we examine whether and how donors reallocate their campaign giving following an intra-chamber change in the identity of the

majority party. We employ a method derived from the innovative study by Cox and Magar (1999) that examines adjustments in contribution patterns following changes in party control of the U.S. House of Representatives. Our analysis, however, goes beyond that of Cox and Magar, examining how that value is distributed among majority party leaders, committee chairs, and backbenchers¹ who do not enjoy any privileged positions in the chamber.

Following existing studies of U.S. Congress by Denzau and Munger (1986), Grier and Munger (1993), and Romer and Snyder (1994), we view campaign contributions as a payment for “legislative services” that members of an assembly can provide on behalf of potential donors. In other words, campaign contributions are an indirect measure of a legislator’s influence. The greater the value of services that a legislator can provide, the more contributions he or she can raise, holding all else equal. By examining the distribution of contributions, we can infer the distribution of power and influence within the chamber.

Formal powers and privileges are not distributed uniformly in a legislature, even within the majority party. Research at the state level indicates that party leaders and committee chairs often have more formal powers and a greater ability to influence legislative outcomes than majority party backbenchers (Francis 1989; Rosenthal 2004; Squire and Hamm 2005; Hamm, Hedlund, and Martorano 2006). As a result, the existing literature suggests that the benefits of majority status, if at all valuable, will mostly fall upon individuals holding these positions.

We argue the opposite: The fruits of the majority status should be shared broadly within the party. Since disloyal backbenchers could defect to the minority and deprive the majority party of procedural control in the chamber, assuring their long-term allegiance is essential to the majority’s continued hold on power. This requires that backbenchers be given a stake in maintaining their party’s collective advantages. Such a stake is furnished by providing them a share of influence, even though they lack formal positions in the legislative process. One of the principal loci in which backbenchers can exert influence is the party caucus, where they can partake in intraparty bargains and offer input into the policymaking process.

Nonetheless, we must begin by considering whether and when majority party status is valuable in state legislatures. Unfortunately, no systematic study exists to establish this value in terms of campaign contributions. There is little point in examining the distribution of benefits within the majority party if there are no benefits to be distributed. Importantly, there are reasons to expect that the value of majority status will systematically differ across chambers. State legislatures vary greatly in the extent to which the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions, committee chairman-

ships, or procedural control over the legislative agenda (Jewell and Whicker 1994; Squire and Hamm 2005). We expect that the value of majority status depends on the internal organization of the chamber; under some institutional arrangements, majority status might not be valuable.

We argue that the prerequisite of valuable majority status is what we term “procedural partisanship.” We define this as complete monopoly by the majority party of all agenda-setting authority in the chamber, including the speakership and control of all committees. In these chambers, the majority party’s control over all legislative outcomes is a near certainty. Other chambers may feature minority party members in control of several positions with agenda-setting authority, even if majority party members retain control over most of them. We label these institutional arrangements “procedurally bipartisan.” Control of such positions by minority party members suggests that majority party membership is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for influence in the legislative process. Bargains can be struck whereby even minority party members are given a seat at the bargaining table and accrue a premium in campaign contributions, while some majority party members are cut out.

To test our expectations, we take advantage of 10 recent instances of partisan change in a sample of eight U.S. state legislatures. First, we compare the value of majority status across chambers that are exclusively organized by the majority party (i.e., procedurally partisan chambers) to those that are not (i.e., procedurally bipartisan chambers). Among our sample of states, we find that the value of majority status is indeed tied to the exclusivity of procedural advantages: it is valuable only if the majority party monopolizes all key posts and control of the legislative agenda. Where majority status is indeed valuable, we find that the majority party premium ranges from over \$10,000 in Indiana to approximately \$35,000 in Georgia. In procedurally non-partisan legislatures, the value of the majority status is statistically zero.

To examine the distribution of majority party premiums, we pool data from the five states where the majority status is shown to be valuable. We estimate how the increased contributions that accompany the change in majority status are distributed among majority party leaders, committee chairs, and backbenchers. We find that much of the majority party premium goes to the backbenchers; simply being a majority party member without holding any privileged positions confers a significant value. This finding supports our argument that successful party government provides its backbenchers with a share of influence so that they can benefit from their party’s status.

In the next section, we describe the logic of our study and formulate hypotheses concerning the conditions under which majority status may,

and may not, be valuable and how the benefits of majority status should be distributed. We then account for our selection of cases and highlight some of the important cross-sectional variation within our sample. Next, we describe our data, statistical model, and results. Following the discussion of the results, we consider their implications for various theories of legislative organization as well as our understanding of lawmaking in statehouses.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

When is Majority Status Valuable?

We distinguish between what we term “procedurally partisan” and “procedurally bipartisan” state legislatures. The former, such as the U.S. House of Representatives, operates on the principle that the majority party completely monopolizes all procedurally important positions and thereby control over the agenda. The latter, such as the Texas and Vermont houses, do not require membership in the majority party as a condition for holding key legislative positions and do not allow the majority party to exercise exclusive control over the agenda.

The vast majority of state legislative chambers are procedurally partisan. In these chambers, the presiding officer—usually the Speaker—is selected within the majority party caucus, whose members then unite behind their nominee in balloting on the chamber floor (Jewell and Patterson 1986). The majority party also enjoys a monopoly over the chamber’s committee system. The party caucus, in conjunction with the presiding officer, decides upon the total number of committees as well as their jurisdictions (Francis 1989; Rosenthal 2004). The caucus also claims for its membership all chairmanships and the right to occupy a preponderance of seats on all committees (Jewell and Whicker 1994). Through these institutional advantages, the majority party controls the flow of legislation; i.e., it has the power to expedite, delay, or stop the passage of bills. These powers are regularly used by party leaders, acting as agents of their caucus, to both move through the chamber legislation that advances the interests of the party and its supporters and to kill legislation that harms their partisan interests, divides the caucus, or is especially controversial (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rosenthal 2004).

Therefore, majority party members in a procedurally partisan chamber should be able to do much more for potential donors than comparably situated members of the minority. If such is the case, majority party members should have greater ability to raise campaign contributions. This leads to our first hypothesis:

The Partisan Hypothesis (H_1): When a legislature is procedurally partisan, members of the majority party will raise more in campaign contributions than will their counterparts in the minority, *ceteris paribus*.

On the other hand, majority parties in procedurally bipartisan chambers do not monopolize committee chairs, chamber leadership positions, or the legislative agenda. Instead, these positions and powers are held by, and distributed to, members across party lines. This pattern of legislative organization is most commonly found in states that have previous experience with single-party dominance or when a bloc within the majority party defects, for whatever reason, from its caucus and agrees to organize the chamber with the minority.

In procedurally bipartisan legislatures, the benefits of majority status should be small. First, minority members who are serving as committee chairs and chamber leaders cannot be expected to wield their authority in a manner that benefits the majority party or its members. Any additional campaign contributions they accrue through the exercise of their influence do not add to the majority party's premium. Second, minority committee chairs and chamber leaders hold their jobs in place of majority party members and with the cooperation and support from other chamber leaders who are often themselves members of the majority party. This suggests that procedurally bipartisan chambers are organized around some principle that supersedes loyalty to one's fellow partisans.

In place of the majority party, a bipartisan agenda-setting structure exists that spreads benefits to some members on both sides of the party line. There are several possibilities as to what might constitute the organizing principle of a bipartisan regime; it could be the speaker's "personal" clique or a regional or ideological grouping. Whatever the organizing rationale, it trumps mere party affiliation in determining who gets a share of influence necessary for rendering legislative services. This leads us to our second hypothesis:

The Bipartisan Hypothesis (H_2): When a legislature is procedurally bipartisan, members of the majority party will not raise more in campaign contributions than their counterparts in the minority, *ceteris paribus*.²

How Are the Benefits of Majority Status Distributed?

A positive average premium for majority status does not reveal much about how these benefits are distributed within the party. In any legislature, the majority party is a complex organization with members holding different roles and with different formal powers and privileges distributed unevenly among these roles. Given such internal complexity, the benefits of the majority status may not accrue uniformly across all members of the party.

Many current studies of party government in both Congress and state legislatures (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Clucas 2001) emphasize the role of majority party leaders, as has our discussion thus far. In these analyses, the majority party determines, as a group, its overall goals and, to achieve these aims, delegates a set of powers to the leadership, including those to be used against their own members as necessary. In turn, the top party leaders delegate power further to another rung of leaders below, such as committee chairs, to help implement the party agenda. Little remains for the backbenchers to do in the party's day-to-day operation, other than to revoke the delegation collectively if the leadership runs afoul of the party as a whole and to set forth the delegation anew.

In most of the existing theoretical conceptions of party government, individual backbenchers are assigned relatively little power. Discussion of their roles is generally limited to that of setting the party government in motion and to bringing it to a close, if necessary, and only by acting as a collective. All day-to-day operations are run by the party leaders, who enjoy myriad formal powers throughout the legislative process (Cox and McCubbins 1993). There is little opportunity for the individual majority party backbenchers to render legislative services on behalf of particular interest groups, many of whom might not be seeking broad policy change. Given the large disparity in potential influence, contributors may prefer directing donations to leaders. This possibility is expressed as our third hypothesis:

The Leadership Hypothesis (H_3): The financial advantages of majority party status will be enjoyed principally by party leaders and committee chairs, not backbenchers.

While the role of leaders is clearly important, we suspect that their use of formal powers will be directed, in large part, at maintaining the support of backbenchers. The majority party leadership requires the support of these individuals for two reasons. Most importantly, the leaders' own jobs depend on the continued support from co-partisans in their caucus. Second, the votes of backbenchers are necessary for upholding the leaders' agenda-setting work. Majority party bills need to be protected from encroachment (i.e., unfriendly amendments) both in committee and on the chamber floor, and they will ultimately need to garner a majority of votes for passage. Support from backbenchers in these steps will be more likely if they have a personal stake in maintaining the cohesion of the majority party. Such a stake can be generated by party leaders through the sharing of their influence with their co-partisans and by advancing the interests of individual backbenchers in the day-to-day operations of the legislature. Such help from an attendant leadership keeps up the value of party membership. In effect, most majority

party members, even those lacking in formal powers, should be granted a share of the collective advantage that their party enjoys and thus some stake worth defending in the majority status itself.

We posit that an important mechanism for distributing the benefits of the majority status to backbenchers is the party caucus.³ The caucus provides a forum for communication between the leadership and backbenchers and for deal making where access is restricted to members of the same party. These activities permit incorporation of the needs of the individual members into the party's overall agenda and allow for resolution of internal disputes through deliberation and bargaining (Rosenthal 2004). The bargains struck in the course of the caucus process may even generate an intraparty consensus that might not naturally exist. Once bargains are struck in the caucus, the majority can honor the deals its members have reached, thanks to its procedural and numerical advantages. The procedural advantages ensure that the deals will be protected from interference and be brought up for consideration on the floor. The numerical advantage—steeled by the intraparty bargains—assures that they have sufficient votes to guarantee passage.

In this conception of party government, majority status brings widespread benefits throughout the party, for the leaders with formal powers and backbenchers without. This leads to the following hypothesis:

The Caucus Hypothesis (H_4): The financial advantages of majority party status will be widely dispersed among members of the majority party caucus, including backbenchers.

SAMPLE OF LEGISLATURES

To assess the monetary value of majority status in U.S. state legislatures, we assemble a sample of legislative chambers that experienced a switch in the identity of the majority party and for which there is readily accessible campaign finance data. Unfortunately, data concerning the contributions made to state legislative candidates have not become systematically available until the past decade.⁴ Additionally, many states have not experienced a recent change in the partisan control of their legislature. These two considerations limit the states from which we can cull our sample.

With these restrictions in mind, we have identified 10 instances of partisan change in lower legislative chambers: Colorado (2004), Georgia (2004), Indiana (1994, 1996, and 2004), Illinois (1996), New Jersey (2001), Oklahoma (2004), Texas (2002), and Vermont (2000).⁵ Four of these cases—Colorado, Indiana (1996), Illinois, and New Jersey—are transitions from Republican to Democratic control, while the remaining are changes in the opposite direction.

This sample includes both procedurally partisan and bipartisan legislatures. The chambers in Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and Oklahoma represent the former category. Each of these closely resembles the U.S. House of Representatives in that the majority party maintains monopoly control over the levers of power. Members of the majority consistently hold all of the chamber's leadership positions, chair all major committees, and control the legislative agenda.⁶ The majority party in each also has a strong legislative caucus with a well-developed leadership structure.

The Texas and Vermont Houses, on the other hand, are procedurally bipartisan. The majority party in the former does not play a role in organizing the chamber. Instead, this task is handled exclusively by the speaker and his bipartisan leadership team (Jones, Micozzi, and Vonnahme 2006; Maxwell and Crain 2006). Team status, which usually translates into various prestigious positions, is based on a member's personal relationship with the speaker or ideology rather than his or her partisan affiliation (Hamm and Harmel 1991; Kraemer, Newell, and Prindle 2003). As a consequence, several prize committees in each legislative session are chaired by members of the minority party. For instance, after the Republicans won control from Democrats following the 2002 elections, Democratic lawmakers continued to chair six committees, including several desirable committees, including the Environmental and Natural Resources Committee and the Rules Committee. Beyond the speakership, the Texas House has no formal party organization.

Similarly, privileged positions in the Vermont House are shared across party lines. The speaker, regardless of his or her partisan affiliation, routinely appoints Democrats, Republicans, and members of third parties to chair committees. Approximately 20 percent of chairmanships in each legislative session are held by non-majority lawmakers, including such choice assignments as the transportation and agriculture committees. Moreover, the chamber has a history of electing minority party members as speaker, something that is rarely observed in other legislatures. A recent example is Ralph C. Wright, a Democrat who served as speaker for six years (1985 through 1991) with a Republican majority (Wright 2005). This suggests that, as in Texas, privileged positions are often distributed based on personal relationships and ideology with party affiliation as a secondary consideration.

The Colorado House is an intermediate case. Although the majority party organizes the chamber and monopolizes all leadership positions and committee chairs, control of these institutions does not allow it to control the legislative agenda. The agenda-setting powers of the majority party are severely limited by the state constitution. In November of 1988, voters passed a ballot

measure entitled, "Give A Vote to Every Legislator (GAVEL)," requiring that all proposed bills be given a vote in committee and, if passed, be considered on the chamber floor (Straayer 2000). This requirement deprives the speaker and committee chairs the ability to unilaterally block legislation, and it transformed Colorado's legislature from a textbook case of majority control to a decentralized body (Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2005, 14). Key posts within the legislature were deprived of the authority to sustain a decidedly partisan agenda and the power needed by party leaders to benefit their backbenchers was decidedly weakened.

Our sample also accounts for two additional, and potentially relevant, variations in state political institutions. The first of these is legislative professionalization, the full spectrum of which is captured by our states. The legislatures in Illinois and New Jersey are considered professional; members serve full-time in nearly year-round sessions with large salaries and staffs. In contrast, the chambers in Georgia, Indiana, and Vermont are typically categorized as "citizen legislatures." In these assemblies, lawmakers meet in short sessions, with only a small salary and per diem and support from very few staff. Finally, the Texas and Oklahoma chambers are classified as hybrid legislatures (Kurtz 1990; Hamm and Moncrief 2004).

Similarly, our sample encompasses a diversity of campaign finance regimes. On one extreme, we have several states with very permissive laws. These include Texas, Illinois, and Indiana, which allow for unlimited giving in state legislative races by individuals and political action committees (PACs). At the other end of the spectrum is the state of Vermont, which has adopted one of the nation's most stringent set of contribution limits, permitting PACs, individuals, corporations, and unions to give no more than \$200 to candidates. While we do not anticipate that our results will vary as a function of legislative professionalization or a state's campaign finance laws, by utilizing a sample of legislatures that vary on these dimensions, we can see if our results are robust to these differences.⁷

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Data and Statistical Model

Following the approach used by Romer and Snyder (1994) and Cox and Magar (1999), we estimate the value of majority party status longitudinally instead of cross-sectionally. Specifically, we examine changes in the campaign contributions made to individual incumbent legislators across two electoral cycles, the first of which resulted in a partisan change. This allows us to hold constant most member-specific determinants of contributions,

an important consideration given the limited data available regarding individual legislators.

Unlike existing studies, for each state in our sample, we also utilize data from two consecutive election cycles (chosen at random) across which the identity of the majority party remains unchanged. Doing so allows us to establish a better baseline for normal session-to-session variations in campaign contributions. Also, it permits a more accurate examination of the changes in legislator status that take place in the absence of partisan change. Changes in leadership positions, committee chairmanships, and committee assignments take place even when the same party remains in control of the chamber. As we are interested in not just the value of the majority status alone but also the distribution of the benefits within the majority party, an examination of the effects from the changes in key positions that do not accompany a chamber-wide partisan change is desirable. The identity of all the states and election years used in this analysis are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1. States and Election Cycles Used in Empirical Analysis

State	Election Cycle 1	Election Cycle 2	Partisan Change	Mean Contributions Cycle 1	Mean Contributions Cycle 2
Colorado	2004	2006	R → D	\$33,291	\$41,027
	1998	2000	Control	20,517	28,442
Georgia	2004	2006	D → R	57,082	58,875
	1998	2000	Control	39,468	37,412
Illinois	1998	2000	Control	213,550	234,454
	1996	1998	R → D	255,169	216,092
Indiana	2004	2006	D → R	76,891	56,369
	2002	2004	Control	65,031	74,667
	1996	1998	R → D	57,041	50,945
	1994	1996	D → R	39,089	52,967
New Jersey	2001	2003	R → D	119,420	153,826
	1999	2001	Control	120,670	113,598
Oklahoma	2004	2006	D → R	59,438	62,079
	2000	2002	Control	41,793	33,437
Texas	2002	2004	D → R	168,796	187,638
	1998	2000	Control	125,296	147,157
Vermont	2000	2002	D → R	2,651	1,776
	1998	2000	Control	1,432	2,683

Notes: The first column identifies the states included in our analysis. The following two columns list the election cycles used for each. The fourth column indicates whether the chamber transitioned from Republican to Democratic control (R → D), Democratic to Republican control (D → R), or is used as a control case (meaning there was no partisan change). The remaining columns identify mean total contributions by state for each election cycle.

Mean total contributions are the average amount of money raised per election cycle by incumbent legislators (minus funds received from party committees and funds donated by legislators to their own campaigns).

Source: Institute on Money in State Politics

To test our first two hypotheses, we estimate the following model:

$$\Delta \text{Contributions} = b_1 + b_2 \Delta \text{Majority Status} + b_3 \Delta \text{Party Leadership Status} + b_4 \Delta \text{Chair Status} + b_5 \Delta \text{Lagged Electoral Safety} + b_6 \Delta \text{Valuable Committee}$$

Our dependent variable is the change in total contributions raised by individual incumbent legislators across two election cycles. Campaign finance data come from the Institute on Money in State Politics, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that compiles campaign contribution information on every state-level candidate and major political party committee in the country. The Institute gathers its data from the state disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign finance reports. Unfortunately, the data do not distinguish giving by political action committees from direct giving by individuals and economic entities. There is no way to isolate PAC contributions in a consistent fashion across multiple states due to differences in the definition of what constitutes a PAC. Thus, we examine changes in total contributions, rather than PAC contributions as per Cox and Magar. Inclusion of individuals' contributions, which may not be strictly motivated by considerations of policy influence, certainly introduces additional noise into the data (Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994). If anything, this biases against findings that statistically confirm our hypotheses. Additionally, since we are only interested in money raised directly by legislators, we subtract from total contributions any money donated by a candidate to his or her own campaign, or given by a political party, or from chamber leadership. All contributions data are measured in constant (2000) dollars.

Change in majority status is operationalized as a trichotomous variable with 1 denoting members who gained majority status from one election to the next, -1 denoting members who lost majority status, and 0 denoting no change. Incumbents who score 0 usually switched parties following a partisan change, are members of a third party, or come from a control case. The change in party leadership and committee chair status are also operationalized trichotomously. Here, a legislator is assigned a value of 1 if he or she became a party leader (chair), -1 if he or she lost her leadership position (chairmanship), and 0 if there was no change in her status (or lack thereof). We consider party leadership positions to include the speaker and majority and minority leaders. The identities of party leaders and committee chairs were obtained through contacts with legislative staffs and various issues of state legislative bluebooks and journals. The existing literature suggests members who gain a committee chair or who are elected to a top leadership post will see bigger increases in campaign contributions, all else being equal (Francis 1989; Cox and Magar 1999).

Previous research suggests a number of additional variables likely to be pertinent in determining the amount of campaign contributions raised by individual incumbent legislators. In order to test our hypotheses, we need to control for these factors. Among others, larger campaign contributions are known to be linked to legislator preferences, favorable committee assignments, and electoral safety (Jones and Borris 1985; Grier and Munger 1993; Thielemann and Dixon 1994).

Data availability precludes the inclusion of legislator preferences. As of yet, preference measures of state legislators (cf. DW-Nominate scores) are not readily available for the years included in our study. Given our use of a longitudinal model, however, it is unlikely that the absence of such a measure would systematically bias our results since there is no reason to expect that legislator preferences change much over a span of just two election cycles.

We do include measures for serving on desirable committees. Scholars and observers of state legislatures generally agree that a seat on a key policy or control committee qualifies as such an assignment. The most widely cited examples of each type are fiscal and rules committees (Francis 1989; Rosenthal 2004; Wright 2005). Fiscal committees shape public policy by deciding which government programs receive funding and how the costs of those programs are to be distributed. Members of these committees are also well situated to supply targeted benefits, such as industry-specific tax breaks. Rules committees help the chamber leadership control the legislative agenda by determining which bills and amendments are allowed on the chamber floor. Both types of committees receive a great deal of attention from lobbyists and afford members excellent opportunities to provide legislative services to organized interests.

Beyond fiscal committees, however, little systematic study is available at the state level on the desirability of other policy committees (Jewell and Whicker 1994). In light of this, we employ what we believe to be a defensible method of systematically identifying those committees that might afford members some of the best opportunities to provide valuable legislative services. We do this using reports from the Institute on Money in State Politics. According to these, the economic sectors with largest contributions to state legislative campaigns are the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) and healthcare sectors (O'Connell 2004; Weiss 2006). Thus, we consider a legislator serving on one of these committees to also be on an important policymaking committee.

For each state in our sample, we have identified the fiscal and rules committees as well as those that have jurisdiction over the FIRE and healthcare sectors. To capture changing membership on these committees, we have

created four variables. Each is operationalized trichotomously in the same manner as the variables discussed above. A value of 1 denotes a member who gained an assignment on a committee, -1 denotes a legislator who lost one of these assignments, and 0 denotes no change. The only modification made to this approach is in the analysis of the Texas House. In this case, the model includes a variable to capture membership on the committee responsible for regulating the oil and natural gas industries. The energy sector in Texas is also a large donor to state legislative races, making service on this committee a plum assignment. Legislators who join a valuable committee might see larger increases in campaign contributions than those who do not.

Lastly, we include a lagged measure of electoral vulnerability. To calculate this measure, we take the difference of a candidate's logged vote shares from the prior two elections.⁸ The data used to create this measure were generously provided by various secretaries of state. Existing research in state politics (c.f., Jones and Borris 1985) has shown that organized interests in state legislative elections tend to target their donations to incumbents who are likely to retain their seats, suggesting that electoral safety should lead to higher donations, especially once party contributions have been removed.

RESULTS

We begin by testing the partisan and bipartisan hypotheses. To do so, we estimate our model separately for each state in our sample. The first sets of findings—the effects of a change in majority status on the total contributions raised—are reported in Table 2 and Table 3. The dependent variable is the change in the amount of campaign contributions in constant dollars raised by a given incumbent legislator across two consecutive election cycles. The independent variables are changes in the status of the legislator that take place over the period examined, including gain or loss of majority status, party leadership positions, committee chairmanships, and memberships on potentially important policy committees.

Table 2 reports the results for the procedurally partisan chambers in our sample: Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and Oklahoma.⁹ In each estimation, the coefficient on Δ Majority Status, which captures the value of serving in the majority instead of the minority party, is positive and significant at the 95 or 90 percent level (using a one-tailed test).¹⁰ These results are consistent with the partisan hypothesis. The gain of majority status by a legislator in a procedurally partisan chamber leads to a statistically significant increase in the receipts of campaign contributions. The estimated value of serving in the

Table 2. Change in Total Contributions to Incumbent Legislators: Procedurally Partisan Chambers

	Georgia	Illinois	Indiana	New Jersey	Oklahoma	Pooled
ΔMajority Status	34,794* (9,274)	26,597* (17,987)	10,578* (3,605)	12,649# (8,699)	18,494* (9,112)	0.26* (0.05)
ΔParty Leader	154,930* (81,130)	18,225 (15,801)	12,897 (15,896)	-103,901 (6,880)	74,056 (82,686)	0.16 (0.46)
ΔCommittee Chair	7,058 (9,837)	-3,445 (17,987)	-92 (4,389)	10,546 (12,627)	-7,275 (8,729)	-0.01 (0.06)
ΔFiscal Committee	-13,877 (8,134)	-441 (6,434)	-5,708 (4,254)	13,683 (17,568)	-621 (5,692)	-0.08 (0.06)
ΔRules Committee	890 (12,267)	22,219 (24,120)	-3,337 (4,870)	9,468 (7,857)	43,559* (21,006)	0.05 (0.10)
ΔFIRE Committee	2,364 (8,816)	-20,468 (19,212)	-507 (3,765)	5,515 (17,479)	-12,303 (9,312)	-0.05 (0.06)
ΔHealthcare Committee	12,769 (16,374)	-3,965 (7,521)	-3,207 (6,289)	-1,634 (16,572)	-3,575 (19,993)	0.02 (0.12)
ΔLagged Vote	12,056 (15,014)	37,955 (39,757)	7,262 (5,997)	-14,308 (28,448)	42,997* (13,325)	0.31* (0.13)
Constant	-362 (4,289)	-18,827 (8,212)	14,517 (4,035)	5,588 (5,186)	-8,310 (4,472)	0.13 (0.07)
N	243	178	298	105	106	932
R ²	0.28	0.05	0.14	0.29	0.32	0.07
F Statistic	6.91	0.89	4.68	412.31	3.51	5.41

*p<0.05; #p<0.10; one-tailed test

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in total contributions raised by individual incumbent legislators across two election cycles. All models are estimated using OLS and robust standard errors. Election cycle dummies are included but not reported here. The pooled model utilizes data from all states with procedurally partisan legislatures and includes both election year and state dummy variables. The dependent variable in the pooled model is the change in total standardized campaign contributions.

majority party in one of these chambers ranges from well over \$10,000 in Indiana to almost \$35,000 in Georgia, with the average value across all five states equaling \$20,622.

Surprisingly, almost none of the remaining explanatory variables routinely exhibit a statistically meaningful effect on contributions. The variable capturing change in party leadership has a positive and large coefficient in all but one case, but it only obtains statistical significance in the Georgia House where a leadership position is worth over \$150,000 in additional campaign contributions. The signs on the remaining terms are inconsistent across chambers and rarely statistically significant. Many of these coefficients should, however, be treated with caution. Rarely do changes in the occupants of formal positions occur across two elections cycles, particularly in the case of top party leaders, which makes accurate estimation of effects difficult and increases the likeli-

hood that the results are driven by the idiosyncratic characteristics of the legislators who experienced the status change.¹¹

To address this possibility, we estimate a model in which the data for all procedurally partisan states are pooled. By combining data for all of these chambers, we can limit the influence of idiosyncratic factors and potentially obtain more accurate coefficient estimates. There are also theoretical reasons to believe that pooling is appropriate. In the preceding section, we argue that all procedurally partisan chambers are driven by the same organizing principle, even if they might differ in significant ways from procedurally bipartisan chambers. This is supported by the findings presented in Table 2 that suggest that the determinants of campaign contributions across our sample of procedurally partisan chambers are quite similar. In order to analyze the pooled data, we standardize the dependent variable. For each chamber-election cycle, we subtract mean total contributions from each legislator's total and divide by the sample standard deviation. As a result, contributions for each chamber-election cycle, can be considered drawn from the standard normal distribution and can be compared across cases.¹² The coefficients on the explanatory variables now indicate the change in standardized campaign contributions that accompany a status change. For example, a coefficient of one means that a one-unit change in the explanatory variable leads to a one standard deviation increase in campaign contributions.

The results of this new estimation are reported in the last column of Table 2. Once again, we find strong support for the partisan hypothesis. The coefficient on Δ Majority Status is positive and significant at $p=0.95$. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that gaining majority status results in a .26 standard deviation increase in total contributions, *ceteris paribus*.¹³ The importance of the majority status in procedurally partisan chambers is further illustrated by standardized regression coefficients (not reported here). These reveal that majority status has, by far, the largest relative impact on changes in campaign contributions.

Table 3 displays the results of our estimations for the procedural bipartisan cases, Texas and Vermont, and the intermediate case, Colorado. The last two columns show pooled estimations. Since Colorado does not have a rules committee, we run the pooled model twice, once including change in membership on a rules committee (and without Colorado) and once excluding this variable (and including Colorado). All of these new estimations are consistent with the bipartisan hypothesis. The gain of majority status in these chambers leads to no statistically significant increase in contributions. In each of these chambers (and in the pooled model), the coefficient on Δ Majority

Status is small and negative. Combined with our earlier results, these findings suggest that procedural partisanship is necessary for ensuring the value of majority status.

Unlike in the procedurally partisan chambers, many of the control variables are important predictors of contributions. In all three chambers, leadership status is quite valuable, reaching over one million dollars in the Texas House.¹⁴ Additionally, in Colorado and Texas, gaining membership on key committees results in a significant increase in campaign contributions. The valuable committees in Colorado appear to be the fiscal and FIRE committees, while in Texas they are those that address the healthcare and the energy sectors. Texas legislators also see a significant increase in contributions upon gaining a committee chairmanship. In both pooled models, however, only the variables for top party leaders, committee chairs, and electoral safety have

Table 3. Change in Total Contributions to Incumbent Legislators: Procedurally Bipartisan Chambers

	Colorado	Texas	Vermont	Pooled	Pooled
ΔMajority Status	-2,498 (2,477)	-209 (11,363)	-204 (184)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
ΔParty Leader	6,656# (4,411)	1,077,719* (252,942)	1,304* (373)	0.99* (0.41)	1.49* (0.55)
ΔCommittee Chair	-1,243 (4,500)	25,239* (14,859)	-153 (383)	0.14# (0.08)	0.13# (0.09)
ΔFiscal Committee	4,112# (3,066)	-15,187 (14,533)	-665 (357)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)
ΔRules Committee	—	2,609 (14,833)	-412 (586)	—	-0.21 (0.16)
ΔFIRE Committee	5,884* (2,770)	16,146 (19,569)	-156 (786)	0.12 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.25)
ΔHealthcare Committee	-4,081 (1,952)	35,524# (24,519)	-473 (982)	0.14 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.16)
ΔOil Committee	—	23,668# (14,833)	—	—	—
ΔLagged Vote	5,140 (5,834)	13,666 (30,707)	900* (445)	0.60 (0.17)	0.56* (0.18)
Constant	9,772 (3,041)	19,977 (6,810)	1,201 (202)	-0.02 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.02)
N	46	224	140	410	364
R ²	0.25	0.57	0.31	0.08	0.09
F Statistic	5.03	3.39	19.43	3.25	2.96

*p<0.05; #p<0.10; one-tailed tests

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in total contributions raised by individual incumbent legislators across two election cycles. All models are estimated using OLS and robust standard errors. Election cycle dummies are included but not reported here. The pooled models utilize data from all states with procedurally bipartisan legislatures and include both election year and state dummy variables. The dependent variable in the pooled model is the change in total standardized campaign contributions.

a statistically meaningful effect. Standardized regression coefficients for the pooled models (not reported here) indicate that the largest relative impact on campaign contributions comes from changes in chamber leadership positions (and changes in electoral safety), while the effect from the change in majority status is negligible. Overall, the dissimilarity between the results in Tables 2 and 3 strongly suggests that chamber governance in procedurally partisan chambers is very different from those that are not.¹⁵ Indeed, the large premiums that accompany both chamber leadership and committee chairman status underscore their importance in the procedurally bipartisan legislatures and suggest that these chambers operate in a top-down manner.

While the results presented thus far indicate that the majority party premiums are much larger in procedurally partisan chambers than those that are not, the results do not indicate whether these observed differences across chamber types are statistically meaningful. To test for this possibility, we conduct statistical tests across our estimations. Specifically, we compare the coefficient on Δ Majority Status from each of the chambers that is procedurally bipartisan (the states in Table 2) to the coefficient from each chamber that is procedurally partisan (the states in Table 3).

Due to space limitations, we do not report the specifics of these tests here. Nonetheless, they provide further support for our first two hypotheses. We find that the value of majority status in all of the procedurally partisan chambers is significantly greater (at $p = 0.95$ or 0.90 using a one-tailed test) than it is in Colorado and Vermont. We also find that the value of majority status in the Georgia, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Indiana Houses is statistically larger than in the Texas House, although the difference between the value in the New Jersey and Texas Houses falls short of statistical significance.

Are these results driven by variations in legislative professionalization and campaign finance regimes? It does not seem to be the case. The value of majority status is not correlated with professionalization. We find evidence of a majority party premium in professional (Illinois and New Jersey), semi-professional (Oklahoma), and citizen legislatures (Indiana and Georgia). There also appears to be no consistent relationship with state campaign finance regimes. We find majority status to be valuable in states with very permissive campaign finance laws (Illinois and Indiana), as well as in those with more stringent regulations (New Jersey and Georgia).

Overall, these findings suggest two distinct modes of legislative governance structures, depending on whether the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions and the agenda. The procedurally partisan form generates a positive value for majority party membership. The procedurally bipartisan form does not generate a positive value merely for majority party membership,

although it does appear to enhance the value of certain privileged positions along the legislative process.

Having established that majority status is valuable in procedurally partisan legislatures, we investigate how this value is distributed among majority party members. Do party leaders and chairmen receive the bulk of the benefits, as suggested by the leadership hypothesis, or are benefits shared broadly throughout the party, as per the caucus hypothesis?

To evaluate the leadership and caucus hypotheses fully, we need to interact our variable that captures a change in majority status with terms that indicate a legislator's other positions within the chamber. For instance, if we want to compare how party leaders benefit from a change in majority status relative to their co-partisans who serve on a fiscal committee, we need to interact dummy variables indicating party leadership status and service on a revenue or expenditures committee with Δ Majority Status.

In the next estimation of our model, we again pool the data for all of the procedurally partisan chambers, but now we interact Δ Majority Status with dummies indicating whether a legislator is a party leader, serves on a fiscal, FIRE, rules, or healthcare committee, and with the variable Δ Committee Chair. We also include the necessary base terms. The new interactions mean that the coefficient on the stand-alone indicator for change in majority status now measures the average premium received by majority-party backbenchers who are not on any important policy or control committees, rather than the premium enjoyed collectively by all majority party members. The remaining interaction terms then allow us to estimate separately the majority premiums enjoyed by top party leaders, committee chairs, and backbenchers serving on key committees.

The results of this new estimation are reported in Table 4.¹⁶ To properly interpret the coefficients on the new interaction terms and to compare these to our baseline category, we calculate marginal effects as recommended by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). The results are reported in Table 5. The second column of the table shows, by formal position, the increase in contributions for members of the new majority party.¹⁷ The third column reports the differences between the changes in contributions received by backbenchers not serving on a key committee and legislators with various privileged positions and whether these differences are statistically significant.

The first row of Table 5 shows that backbenchers not serving on a fiscal, rules, FIRE, or healthcare committee enjoy, on average, a .11 standard deviation increase in total campaign contributions. This increase falls just short of reaching statistical significance using a two-tailed test, although it is significant (at $p=0.90$) using a one-tailed test. Importantly, it suggests that the value

Table 4. Change in Total Contributions to Incumbent Legislators: Procedurally Partisan Chambers (Pooled Data)

Δ Majority Status	0.11 (0.07)
Δ Party Leader	-0.70 (0.53)
Party Leader	0.78# (0.46)
Party Leader * Δ Majority Status	0.59 (0.39)
Δ Committee Chair	0.02 (0.06)
Δ Committee Chair * Δ Majority Status	0.06 (0.07)
Δ Fiscal Committee	-0.13# (0.07)
Fiscal Committee	0.11# (0.06)
Fiscal Committee * Δ Majority Status	0.15# (0.08)
Δ Rules Committee	0.01 (0.10)
Rules Committee	0.02 (0.11)
Rules Committee * Δ Majority Status	0.24* (0.12)
Δ FIRE Committee	-0.07 (0.08)
FIRE Committee	0.03 (0.07)
FIRE Committee * Δ Majority Status	0.16* (0.08)
Δ Healthcare Committee	0.05 (0.12)
Healthcare Committee	0.01 (0.08)
Healthcare Committee * Δ Majority Status	-0.12 (0.11)
Δ Lagged Vote	0.34* (0.12)
Constant	-0.07 (0.11)
N	932
R ²	0.11
F Statistic	4.70

*p<0.05; #p<0.10; two-tailed tests

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in total standardized campaign contributions raised by an incumbent legislator. The model is estimated using OLS and robust standard errors. Election cycle and state dummies are included but not reported here.

of majority status is widely distributed within the party and not necessarily contingent upon holding a privileged position in the legislative chamber.

The results in the bottom four rows suggest a similar conclusion. Backbenchers serving on key policy and control committees consistently see their campaign contributions increase by meaningful amounts upon gaining majority status. Backbenchers with a seat on a rules committee see a .38 standard deviation increase in total contributions, while those serving on a fiscal or FIRE committee receive increases of .37 and .31, respectively. All these increases are statistically significant at $p=0.95$ using a two-tailed test. In the procedurally partisan chambers included in our analysis, many, if not most, members of the majority caucus serve on at least one of these three types of committees. For example, in the Georgia House, approximately 40 percent of majority party members serve on one of the chamber’s two fiscal committees. While service on a key policymaking committee clearly enhances the value of majority status, this enhancement is shared broadly within the party and does not fall exclusively to committee chairs as the leadership hypothesis suggests. Equally as important, the coefficients on change

Table 5. Average Increase in Contributions Following a Gain of Majority Status: Procedurally Partisan Chambers (Pooled Data)

	Increase in Contributions	Increase Relative to Backbenchers who Gained Majority Status
Gain majority status (backbenchers)	0.11## (0.08)	—
Gain majority status while serving as a top party leader	1.49* (0.61)	1.38* (0.61)
Gain Majority Status & Gain Chairmanship	0.20* (0.08)	0.08 (0.11)
Gain Majority Status while serving on rules committee	0.38* (0.16)	0.27 (0.16)
Gain Majority Status while serving on fiscal committee	0.37* (0.08)	0.26* (0.10)
Gain Majority Status while serving on FIRE committee	0.31* (0.14)	0.20# (0.12)
Gain Majority Status while serving on Healthcare committee	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.14)

* $p<0.05$; # $p<0.10$; two-tailed tests

$p<0.10$ using a one-tailed test

Notes: The second column shows the standard deviation increase in campaign contributions, by formal position in the legislature, following a gain in majority status. The final column shows whether this value is significantly different from the change experienced by backbenchers without assignments on key policy or control committees. For instance, the fourth row shows that legislators who gain majority status while serving on a rules committee enjoy a .38 standard deviation increase in total contributions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

in committee assignment and on our stand-alone measures of committee membership (see Table 4) are almost always statistically insignificant. This finding indicates that serving on an important policy or control committee without being in the majority might not be particularly valuable. In other words, committee membership is much more valuable for majority party members than for the minority.

The results presented in Table 5 also show that the majority party premium is distributed to lawmakers who occupy privileged positions in the chamber. Top party leaders see their campaign contributions rise by a whopping 1.49 standard deviations when their party gains majority status. This increase is much larger than that enjoyed by the typical backbencher. Lawmakers who gain both a chairmanship and majority status see their contributions rise by .20 standard deviation. While this increase is significant, it is not statistically larger than the premium in contributions enjoyed by backbenchers—either those with or without an assignment on a key policy or control committee.¹⁸ Interestingly, the premium enjoyed by those who gain a chairmanship in conjunction with majority status is, on average, smaller than that enjoyed by backbenchers on a fiscal, rules, or FIRE committee, although these differences are not statistically meaningful.

Overall, the results reported in Table 5 provide strong support for the caucus hypothesis. The premium in campaign contributions enjoyed by the majority party is not distributed principally among those with privileged positions in the legislature, but rather is shared widely among the majority party membership. Backbenchers (those with and without key assignments), top party leaders, and committee chairs all benefit. Nevertheless, important caveats do emerge. First, while benefits are distributed widely, top party leaders see the largest total increase in total campaign contributions. Second, the value of backbencher status within the majority party varies substantially as a function of a lawmaker's committee assignments. Change in the majority status by itself, without membership on a key policy or control committee, confers a relatively small and statistically inconsistent increase in campaign contributions. Service on a powerful committee, in conjunction with majority status, offers much larger and more robust increases. The large size of the majority party contingents on such committees, however, means that these committee-based premiums are shared broadly throughout the party.

Before concluding, we should note that the nature of our research design limits our sample to legislative chambers where both the Democratic and Republican parties are competitive. For some readers, this may imply that the necessary conditions for valuable majority party status include not only procedural partisanship, but also a competitive two party system. We do not

believe this to be the case. As Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell (1994) note, legislative parties seek to maximize their chamber seat share. As a result, it is unlikely that even a party that enjoys a very sizable majority would stop rewarding the loyalty of their backbenchers. Not only are defections to the minority party embarrassing, but given the unpredictable nature of politics, there is no reason for the current majority not to zealously guard each seat.

IMPLICATIONS

In this article, we have developed a theory of what determines whether majority status is valuable in a legislature and how that value is distributed within the majority party. We find that the value of majority status in state legislatures is sensitive to the particulars of chamber organization. Serving in the majority is valuable only if the chamber is procedurally partisan. That is, it is valuable if every path for a bill through the legislative process and every path for individual legislators to advance through the chamber's leadership hierarchy is constrained to lie within the majority party. On the other hand, if the legislature is organized in a procedurally bipartisan fashion, the majority party ceases to be "the only game in town," and the value of majority status falls statistically to zero. In these chambers, the members of the organizing coalition are scattered across party lines and the benefits they accrue do not coincide with service in any particular political party.

In those chambers where majority status is valuable, a large proportion of this value falls to backbenchers. Being a majority party backbencher is sufficient to confer a premium in campaign contributions, although the distribution of these benefits favors backbenchers on important policy or control committees. Nonetheless, occupying a leadership position in the legislative hierarchy is no guarantee of an additional premium. Some posts, such as top party leadership, confer a large bonus while others, such as committee chairmanships, do not. This suggests a redistributive mechanism is at work within the majority party, through which the leaders are working not only for themselves but also for their fellow co-partisans with less formal powers and privileges. We speculate that this internal cooperation is engendered and facilitated by the caucus process, which provides a venue for intra-party communication and bargaining, making it easier to arrange Pareto-improving trades within the majority party. The consequent boost in the value of majority status helps undergird party government in procedurally partisan legislatures.

The findings presented here have important implications for our understanding of policy making in state legislatures. They suggest that, in procedurally partisan assemblies (i.e., the vast majority of state legislatures),

majority party backbenchers exert substantial informal influence on the policymaking process and derive substantial benefits—in terms of campaign contributions—even with limited formal powers. In such chambers, we suspect a bottom-up process prevails, perhaps through the majority party caucus, and resulting policy outcomes should broadly reflect the interests of majority party members. The same cannot be said for procedurally bipartisan legislatures. In these, the loci of key policy decisions appear to lie outside the majority party caucus and in the hands of top leaders and committee chairs who may be agents of a cross-party governing coalition. Policymaking in these chambers is not likely to reflect that of the entire majority party.

Why might some states adopt and maintain a procedural bipartisan structure over the partisan variant? Based on our understanding of the cases we examine, there does not appear to be a single, simple answer to this puzzle. Potential answers might include past history as well as various historical “accidents” of leadership and other events that mark institutional developments in these states. For example, Vermont and Texas share a history of long periods of single party dominance, coupled with periods of highly personalistic legislative leadership. Regardless, the exact roles played by past events in shaping the institutions in these chambers remain beyond the scope of this article, but certainly warrant further study.

Our findings suggest that sustainable party government in state legislatures depends on the interaction between the formal rules and institutions and the informal distribution of benefits. Maintaining formal mechanisms of majority party influence is predicated on spreading its fruits widely among its members, even if they do not hold formal powers. Put differently, successful party government rests on creating positive value for the backbenchers, not simply monopolizing all agenda-setting power in the hands of the majority party.

ENDNOTES

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1. For the sake of simplicity, we use the term “backbencher” to refer to lawmakers who do not occupy formal leadership positions in the legislative hierarchy.

2. Members of the cross-party governing coalition in procedurally bipartisan chambers may raise more in campaign contributions than the non-members. Determining the membership of such coalitions is, however, difficult and beyond the scope of this article.

3. Informal mechanisms might also exist, such as those based on a personal relation-

ship between the leaders and backbenchers. The key remains that these relationships are internal to the majority party.

4. For most states, this data is not systematically available until the mid- or late-1990s.

5. Our sample constitutes a nearly exhaustive set of state lower houses that underwent one or more changes in partisan control between 1994 and 2004 for which campaign finance data and data for our control variables were readily available. A handful of states, including Washington (1994), Michigan (1996), and Missouri (2002), were excluded because the recent partisan changes in these legislatures coincided with the effective date of term limit laws, leaving too few incumbents for a meaningful analysis.

6. For the purposes of this article, we expressly require that a procedurally partisan chamber feature: (1) majority party monopoly of the speakership; (2) majority party monopoly of the chairmanships of all standing committees other than ethics; and (3) that the majority party occupy a majority of the seats on all standing committees other than ethics. For most legislatures, these conditions suffice to give the majority party monopoly control of the legislative agenda. Using these criteria, the chambers examined in this article fall neatly into two distinct groups, with one exception. In the Colorado House, the majority party, despite controlling all formal levers of power, is unable to monopolize the legislative agenda due to a constitutional amendment. Information used to categorize states was obtained through an examination of the existing literature, legislative journals and rules, and consultations with legislative staff.

7. These chambers also vary substantially in terms of speaker and committee powers (c.f., Clucas 2001; Hamm, Hedlund, and Martorano 2006). Variations in the value of majority status do not appear to depend on these factors.

8. Δ Lagged Electoral Safety = $\log(\text{Percent}_{t-2}) - \log(\text{Percent}_{t-1})$, where Percent_t is the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent in an election year t . There are two instances when a redistricting year intervenes between the elections used to create our measure (the substantive case in Texas and a control case in Indiana, both following the 2000 census). Unfortunately, this cannot be rectified due to data unavailability. We do not believe that this has a meaningful effect on our results. Estimations that exclude the lagged electoral safety variable yield comparable results.

9. The estimation for Indiana uses three instances of partisan change and a control case. If estimated separately, change in majority status is statistically significant in each instance.

10. Because we make directional predictions for each of our explanatory variables, we employ one-tailed tests of statistical significance. However, the value of majority status is significant using a two-tailed test in all procedurally partisan states except New Jersey. Observe that no coefficient on a variable of interest can be negative and significant because all of our directional predictions are positive.

11. For instance, the large negative coefficient on the change in party leadership status in New Jersey is attributable to Albio Sires. Assemblyman Sires went from Democratic backbencher to speaker between the 2000–01 and 2002–03 sessions. For the 2001 election, he raised well over \$265,000, but for the 2003 election, he raised only \$83,000. New Jersey also features a negative coefficient on the lagged electoral safety variable. This represents the only negative coefficient on this variable among all our cases, but it fails to even approach statistical significance.

12. The standardized contribution is thus

$$k_{ij} = \frac{(c_{ij} - \mu_{ij})}{\rho_{ij}}$$

and $k_{ij} \sim N(0,1)$, where m_{ij} is the sample mean and r_{ij} is the sample standard deviation, for chamber i and election cycle j .

13. Surprisingly, several coefficients on the variables capturing changes in assignments to key committees are negative. We suspect that this might have to do with politics of committee assignment, specifically, which legislators lose membership in these committees when a party loses majority status and which gain new seats on these committees when a party wins the majority. Such questions, however, are beyond the scope of this article.

14. Since the only party leader in the Texas House of Representatives is the speaker, Δ Party Leader reduces to a measure of movement into and out of the speakership.

15. Our results for Texas are consistent with those in Thielemann and Dixon's (1994) study of campaign contributions in the Texas House in the 1988–89 period. They find that being in the majority party generated no additional contributions, but members' institutional positions did.

16. We use a two-tailed test for this section because the leadership and caucus hypotheses yield potentially conflicting predictions.

17. These estimates are calculated by simply adding the coefficients on any relevant terms. For example, to calculate the increase in contributions enjoyed by members who gain majority status while serving on a fiscal committee, we add Δ Majority Status (.11) to Fiscal Committee (.11) and Δ Majority Status * Fiscal Committee (.15).

18. The lack of benefits accompanying committee chairmanships does raise an interesting question: Why do legislators seek chairmanships? It may be that they are motivated by desire for good public policy or that they possess expertise in a policy area. Also, by rendering service to their co-partisans, committee chairs may accumulate the respect and prestige needed to rise to the top party leadership, which we do find to be highly valuable.

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